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ABSTRACT
This paper outlines a method, called "Strategic Argument Mapping" (SAM), for
identifying the content and structure of an organization's strategy. The
method is based on the work of Stephen Toulmin, a philosopher. Toulmin's
work has been used by Mason and Mitroff (1980) to compare the ramifications
of strategic alternatives at one point in time. We use it here as a means of
focusing attention on the links between strategic ideas over time.
The data come from one of the most dramatic strategy reformulations ever to
take place, the strategic reorientation American Telephone and Telegraph has
made in the last 10 years. The analysis outlined in the paper suggests that
the major changes which this company made in their understanding of two key
strategic concepts - competition and structure - are closely linked to their
changing ideas about technology and the public interest. This second pair of
concepts is particularly interesting because it provides a bridge between
strategic arguments made early in the period studied, and the quite different
arguments made more recently.
SAM thus illustrates, in at least a preliminary way, the debt new strategy
can owe to past strategy. We also suggest, in the concluding section of the
paper, that SAM illustrates a needed way of simultaneously tracking both the
content and the process of strategy reformulation - two sides of a coin that
are all too often artificially separated in strategy research.
Prepared for the Strategic Management Association Conference, Philadelphia,
October 10-13, 1984. Support of National Sciences Grant SES - 10462 is
gratefully acknowledged.
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Strategy formulation is a major topic of interest in the field of strategic
management. Most researchers have thought of formulation as a kind of
entrepreneurial problem solving activity. Even when formulation is discussed
within the context of an established firm, the implicit assumption is usually
that the strategist begins, conceptually at least, tabula rasa . Although the
cost of moving away from current commitments must be considered, according to
this view new alternatives can be, and should be, generated without reference
to the assumptions upon which current strategy rests.
We find this point of view problematic. Established firms, with an existing
strategy, are tied to that strategy not just by capital assets, contracts
with buyers and other tangible commitments. An intellectual commitment has
been required to carry out the established strategy. The environment, the
industry, and the company have been assumed to have a certain character.
Certain actions have been assumed to have a high probability of leading to
desired outcomes. The strategy identified certain problems as being critical
for the organization to address, while other problems were less important.
These assumptions, causal beliefs and task orientations must be changed if
strategy is to be changed, and moving away from this intellectual framework
is not the task of a moment. The intellectual task of strategy reformulation
is to recreate understanding of the environment, industry and company; to
discover and test more appropriate causal beliefs; and to isolate the tasks
that will now be most important. Though a wide range of strategic
alternatives may be generated, we believe the nature of new alternatives is
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partially understood in terras of the old strategy, no matter how
unsatisfactory it can now be seen to be.
Work in cognitive psychology suggests that categorization of ideas operates
hierarchically, with new ideas related to established "frames" (Bartlett,
1932; Minsky, 1975; Klatzky, 1980). In addition, idea generation itself
depends heavily upon analogy from past experience and observations (Maier,
1945). This is not to say that new ideas cannot be generated; merely to say
that they must be recognized and evaluated in terms that grow out of the
past.
The new organization member, including the CEO brought in from the outside,
is not initally tied to the intellectual commitments of past strategy, which
is why organization change so often requires new leadership. But the new CEO
can not totally escape the influence of past strategy on the new. The tie
between old strategy and new is created by the need to find out about the
organization from current members. The tie is also created by anticipating
the need to communicate changing strategy to a variety of stakeholders:
employees, stockholders, the financial community, and even other
competitors.
These observers have a more distant and simplified view of strategy. By
design, they are less aware of the stresses and strains that brought about
the need for strategic change. To discuss new strategies the CEO must draw a
bridge from the old to the new; showing that the inadequacies of the old
strategy are met by capabilities of the new. Thus even the CEO brought in
from outside the company is forced, to some extent, to frame new strategy in
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terras of the past, if only in denial.
The study of strategy reformulation must attend to these links. We believe
that the stamp of the old strategy will always appear in some form on the new
strategy - even when, especially when, that new strategy is ably conceived.
More strongly, the most probable alternatives from which the new strategy was
drawn are at least loosely constrained by this intellectual past.
Strategy Reformulation at AT&T
This paper makes a preliminary attempt to empirically test these
expectations. We have chosen for study a company whose change in strategy
was fundamental and dramatic, involving both a change of many deeply embedded
ideas and values, and a radical change in the company's structure and way of
operating. In fact, the extent of American Telephone and Telegraph's change
in direction has surprised many observers as " more daring than anyone ever
thought could come from the telephone company, (BusinessWeek , October 11,
1982.)
The company's redirection involved agreeing to divest its 22 local operating
companies, and give up a monopoly position in the telephone business. This
decision followed almost a decade of activity not only by the Department of
Justice, but by the Federal Communications Commission, other regulatory
bodies, and the legislature. In its dealings with the federal government, as
well as many state level bodies, AT&T faced a diverse set of actors who were
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rarely acting in concert; indeed, they often seemed to pursue conflicting
aims.
Diverse technological developments - beginning somewhat earlier - were also
part of the picture. Advances in signal transmission technology, the
development first of microwave and later satellite transmission, made one of
the basic rationales for AT&T's ^natural monopoly' in intercity transmission
- the physical limitations of the cable network - less compelling. Rapid
adoption of computer technology in the 1960's demanded facilities for digital
transmission to facilitate communication between computers, something for
which AT&T's existing cable network was not well suited. The areas of data
transmission and data-processing services were also merging due to changes in
technology, but AT&T was constrained by the 1956 Consent Decree from offering
data processing related services.
Beginning in the 1960's, primarily through the efforts of the Federal
Communications Commission, various sectors of this rapidly changing industry
were gradually opened to competitive entry. In November 1974, allegedly in
response to AT&T actions in countering the growth of competition in these
newly competitive sectors, the Department of Justice brought its suit against
AT&T, Western Electric and Bell Laboratories charging the defendants with
monopolizing telecommunications services and products.
While the suit was pending, AT&T was also faced with the uncertainties
created by regulatory, legislative, and judicial activities. The FCC's
Computer Inquiry II was conducted to investigate, among other things, the
advisability of completely deregulating customer premises equipment, and to
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examine the question of whether AT&T should be permitted to offer computer
services. Numerous bills were introduced in the House and Senate; many
required some degree of divestment and certainly all would have had a major
impact on the industry. There were also judicial rulings outside the
antitrust case.
AT&T claimed that they were not in violation of antitrust law. More
generally, they resisted many of the ideas presented in the various other
forums in which telecommunications policy was being debated, as neither in
their own interest nor the interest of the public. Two years after the
Department of Justice suit was filed, for example, John D. deButts, Chairman
of the Board of AT&T still had "a strong conviction" that what he called
"selective competition" would hurt the public. He "insisted" that the
integrated system built up by the company under monopoly was its "greatest
strength" and announced:
Preservation of the Bell System's organization structure, we are
convinced, is in the best interest of the public and our share
owners. We have no intention of acquiescing in its undoing.
The New York Times
,
Dec. 19, 1976, p. 71
Within three years, however, AT&T had completely reversed this position. The
1979 Annual Report speaks of "legislation. . .which can yield the public the
benefits of competition." And in a presentation to the New York Society of
Security Analysts, deButt's successor, Charles L. Brown, said:
We have listened carefully to the concerns of Congress and
others. And we have indicated a readiness to accommodate to
changes in our industry 1 s basic structure — changes that are
perhaps more far-reaching than any in the history of U.S.
business.
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The Wall Street Transcript , Dec. 17, 1979, p. 56453
This paper focuses on how AT&T changed its posture so dramatically on
proposals to alter the fundamental nature of its industry and itself. We
document important aspects of that change, and suggest how AT&T's experience
may be generalized to understand more about strategy reformulation as it is
undertaken by all organizations, including those with much less dramatic
pressures for strategic change.
Methodology
Our data set consists of 3722 lines of computer file text from the nine AT&T
Annual Reports from 1975 to 1983. From each Report the Chairman's Letter to
Share Owners and those sections of the report dealing with the regulatory,
legislative, or judicial actions of the federal government were entered into
microcomputer text files. Line numbers were added to simplify reference.
The data set covers the period from the DOJ antitrust suit through the date
on which the major terms of the Consent Decree took effect. The Annual
Reports offer a fairly compact statement of corporate activity and strategy
over this period. They have the advantage of being issued on a year by year
basis, to the same broad audience. The initial checks we have done indicate
that the statements of policy and strategy offered in these reports are quite
consistent with the many other statements made by company officials in
legislative hearings, to the press, and to members of the financial
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community. For this company, data excess is a problem. Our decision was to
test our ideas for coding and analysis on the set of statements found in the
Annual Reports, and then augment the data with other sources of information,
if necessary.
In essence, we suggest that statements made in the Annual Reports offer a
convincing "argument" in support of AT&T's strategy. Of necessity, the
argument describes the company's view of its environment, including its view
of the desirability of degregulating the American telecommunications
industry, with all its attendant implications for the structure of the
industry and AT&T's mode of operating therein.
To clarify the nature of this strategic argument we are using a form of
analysis first suggested by a philosopher, Steven Toulmin (1958). Mason and
Mitroff (1980) suggest that Toulmin 's way of thinking about argument is
especially appropriate for structuring debates about policy issues in
organizations, and they have developed a method for generating and evaluating
strategic arguments along the lines Toulmin suggests. We propose that
Toulmin also provides a useful framework for making a post hoc analysis of
strategic argument. The method of analysis is especially useful for
analyzing situations as complicated as the one with which AT&T has wrestled
over the last ten years.
Toulmin 's approach can be used to generate what we call a "strategic argument
map." Our interpretation of this method of analysis requires that a text be
divided into "arguments" which are then further broken down into seven major
categories:
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1. the Claim, a statement put forth as worthy of belief
2. Grounds, or Data, statements brought up to support the claim
3. Qualifiers, which indicate the force with which a statement is made
4. Warrants, general statements which justify the logical connection
between claim and grounds
5. Subclaims, contigent claim to be understood as true or worthy of belief
only in the context provided by the "key" or "summary" claim of an
argument
6. Elaborations, which provide further information about any of the above
statements
7. Reiterations, which repeat previous statements.
All the text in our sample was divided into topic areas, then subdivided into
"arguments," each supporting a major claim. The claim was identified, and
the rest of the text labeled as one of the six supporting elements of the
argument (items 2-7 above) as appropriate. (Occasionally a portion of the
text was not linked to an argument. Almost always this part of the Report
provides factual material - about the progress of federal activities, for
example - without further comment.)
The various components of the argument were then copied from the computer
text file and stored in argument format, as illustrated in Appendix A. The
arguments that are outlined by this process can also be represented
diagrammatically, as Mason and Mitroff have done, and as we do in the body of
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this paper. Further information about the method and a set of coding
protocols is available in a coding manual we developed for an earlier project
(Fletcher and Huff, 1984).
SAM was supplemented by a second method of content analysis which uses
computer search routines to count word usage in a given section of text. The
routines used can also create a second file of full sentences containing the
word or phrases which were the subject of search, on a year by year basis, as
illustrated in Appendix B. This process allowed key concepts to be easily
identified and counted, and facilitated tracing key concepts over time for
subsequent analysis within their fuller argument contexts.
One of us coded all material for odd years, the other coded the even years.
Unlike the word search, which is a mechanical process, mapping this material
requires that the coders understand the context of a given statement, and
consistently identify argument components. We drew upon the coding manual to
guide the coding process and help achieve intercoder reliability. To test
for intercoder reliability the divisions of the Annual Reports marked by
headings were taken as "units" of analysis. A 10% random sample of eight
such units from the data set (four from even years, four from odd) was
selected for measurement of intercoder reliability. Each sample was coded by
both authors.
We arrived at the most appropriate measures of intercoder agreement by
reasoning that some coding decisions were more critical than others. In.
particular, intercoder agreement on the location of major claims, and on the
location of argument boundaries, are especially important. Thus the
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following comparisons were made in our assessment of intercoder reliability.
1. Agreement on the location of claims. On this measure, # out of #
matched, for agreement of x%.
2. Agreement on the extent of each given claim's supporting elements. #
out of # argument matched 100%. Of the remaining #, none matched less
than x% on an item by item comparison.
Summaries by Year
After examining each year's set of arguments, we summarized the basic
position(s) AT&T presents in each year of the period studied, along with very
brief notes on the events of each year, as follows.
1975
In November 1974, the Department of Justice brought the antitrust suit
against AT&T. (The FCC had been opening industry sectors - customer premises
equipment and intercity transmission - to competition since the 1960 's.)
In the Annual Report, AT&T was arguing very strongly for the
traditional principles that had guided the telephone industry and
against what they saw as the PCC's and Department of Justice's
challenges to these same principles. They were urging Congress
to take up the task of establishing an "authoritative" policy to
guide the industry.
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1976
In 1976 the Communications Consumer Reform Act came close to passing in the
House of Representatives. The Act would have ended nearly all competition in
the telecommunications industry.
The 1976 Report echoes 1975. AT&T was arguing very strongly for
the validity of traditional policy and aims of the industry and
against what it saw as the FCC's challenge to these alas. It was
also advocating that policy should properly be set by Congress
and urging Congress to "reaffirm and clarify the intent of the
Communications Act of 1934."
1977
Congress reversed its earlier views; far less favorable legislation was being
introduced, most requiring some degree of divestment.
AT&T is beginning to recognize that changes may be required of
it. Strong arguments are presented in defense of the nationwide
network and its integrated structure. However they also begin to
formulate their view of themselves as competitors. A lengthy
"Statement of Policy" presents AT&T's stand on a wide range of
issues.
1978
John deButts' last year as Chairman.
AT&T's arguments were concerned primarily with a defense of the
integrated structure of the Bell System. They argued that their
integrated structure had provided well for the American public,
would continue to provide all future needs, and should remain
unimpaired. In recognition of the requirements of a more
competitive industry, now accepted as a reality, the company
reports on a large-scale restructuring intended to strengthen
their marketing function.
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1979
Bills intended to update and revise the Communications Act of 1934 are
considered in both the House and Senate. The FCC issues a Tentative Decision
in its Computer Inquiry II (see 1980).
AT&T has completed its major restructuring. Although it is still
arguing for the preservation of the "unitary management of the
nationwide network" and its integrated structure, it is also
looking to compete in computer services markets. AT&T announces
its willingness to accept "alternative futures".
1980
The FCC issues its Computer Inquiry II final decision which allows AT&T to
compete in some deregulated markets and offer "enhanced non-voice" services,
provided it forms fully separate subsidiaries to do so.
Arguments in the Report primarily focus on presenting reasons for
the second large—scale restructuring in two years. AT&T has
accepted the inevitability of competition and is identifying
transition issues critical to its development as a full-fledged
competitor. They see progress towards resolution of DOJ suit but
are less confident that their integrated structure will remain
intact than they have been in previous years.
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1981
In January 1981 the DOJ antitrust suit came to trial. There was some early
hope of resolution but the incoming Reagan administration brings a change in
key DOJ personnel. In October, the Senate passes S. 898, the
Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1981. H.R. 5158 is
introduced in December.
By the time its Annual Report is published, AT&T had accepted the
government-proposed Consent Decree, ending the antitrust suit and
modifying the restrictions placed on AT&T by the earlier 1956
Consent Decree. Arguments focus on presenting reasons behind
accepting the Consent Decree. AT&T sees HR 5158 as imposing even
more restraints on its ability to compete than the Senate bill.
1982
The government-proposed Consent Decree is accepted January 8, 1982, and DOJ
drops the antitrust suit. AT&T blocks post-Decree legislation (H.R. 5158) in
the House of Representatives by urging share owners to undertake a massive
letter-writing campaign.
The primary focus in on giving information to share owners on
effects of Consent Decree.
1983
Deregulation of telephones and other equipment effective January 1, 1984.
Report focuses on "The New AT&T.* Emphasis on definition of
business and corporate committments.
These summaries document changes in AT&T's strategic posture based on
arguments made by the company itself, rather than on third party
assessments. While more could be done with this macro level of analysis, it
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is interesting to point out that the company's focus of attention fits very
well into models of death and dying. Tannenbaum (1976) notes that such
models can be usefuly aplied to organizational transitions, and suggests that
organizational development efforts have focused too much on the introduction
of new forms of behavior and have not sufficiently attended to the need for
organization members to deny needed change, resist identifying themselves
with change and mourn the passing of the old state.
These phases can be identified at a more strategic level in our own data
set. .AT&T spent most of its efforts in 1975 and 1976, for example, denying
the need for change and objecting to the kinds of change being made.
Acceptance of the need for change comes gradually. Mourning can be observed
as the Company accepts the Consent Decree in 1981, which Chairman Brown
describes as "a wrenchingly difficult decision."
In order for new ideas to become a part of the organization, Tannenbaum
argues, the transition period must explictly allow the past to be examined
and relinquished. Brown might be said to be following this advice when he
writes in the 1983 Report, a Report which in general is full of optimism and
plans for the future:
At midnight on December 31, 1983, the Bell System passed into
history, bringing to a close a unique and memorable chapter in
the chronicle of American business enterprise. .. .Let it be
noted... that the Bell System people did what was asked of
them. .. .The record of the Bell System was one of promises kept,
and we are proud of that record. The future of the Bell System's
separate parts is promising. But we can only regret that an
unyielding combination of technological, regulatory, legal and
political pressure brought to an end what very well may have 'been
the most successful large scale business organization in
history.
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Micro-analysis of Reformulation
In the next part of the project reported here, we tried to look more closely
at the substance of strategy reformulation over the ten years summarized
above. The method was to follow several key concepts through the data base,
documenting any changes in the way in which these concepts were defined over
time, and then look at the arguments which incorporated each instance of
these key concepts. Our aim was to gain a more detailed understanding of
what was actually involved in the dramatic change in strategy that AT&T
accomplished.
The process might be compared to trying to pull a few "threads" from the
whole cloth of strategy; the accompanying danger of missing the essential
nature of the whole is lessened by the initial summary of the Reports. We
also feel that by beginning with the concepts of "competition" and
"organization structure", we have chosen two concepts essential to the
strategy of any firm, and two concepts that are especially relevant to
understanding AT&T over the last decade.
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A Changing View of Competition
Over the course of nine years, the Annual Reports refer to competition,
competitors and other derivatives of "compete" 142 times. The changing
strategic posture of AT&T toward competition can be illustrated by a micro
level analysis of these many references.
In the early years of 1975 and 1976, the company refused to take competition
at face value. The word was put in quotes, spoken of as "market allocation
in the guise of competition," and referred to as "selective" or "contrived"
competition. The company's basic stand is illustrated by the argument mapped
in Figure 1, taken from the 1975 Annual Report.
Figure 1 about here
By 1977 this stand was changing. The lengthy "Statement of Policy" in the
1977 annual report takes a more accepting view of competition. The word is
used in quotes only twice, and the various qualifying adjectives which appear
in previous years are absent. While all along the company has indicated a
"willingness" to compete, they now more specifically note they will set
earnings goals "that are competitive with those of other leading U.S.
enterprises," and say specifically they will "compete vigorously" in
1. To highlight the term discussed, boldface type will sometimes be used,
Except where specifically noted, the emphasis is ours.
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(Because. . .
)
GROUNDS # 1
123 CFragmented service], we be-
lieve, will be the consequence,
for example, o-f the Federal Com-
munications Commission's proposal
that telephone companies be re-
quired to permit direct connection
to their lines o-f terminal equip-
ment over which they have no control
(Because. . .
)
GROUNDS # 2
12S This same trend compromises —
indeed it contradicts - the
principle o-f universality.
(Because.
. .
)
GROUNDS • 1
compensate
-for the loss to
itors o-f revenues that help
the common costs o-f al 1
services, telephone companies
ave no alternative except to
their rates for basic exchange
e, thereby reversing their
ic aim o-f bringing telephone
e within the economic reach
e and more people.
(Since.
.
. )
WARRANT
120 The ex per i ence o-f telecom-
muni cat ions autrtori ties around
the world con-firms that frag—
menting service responsi bility
impairs service quality.
(It is asserted that...)
KEY CLAIM
118 (We have opposed) this trend
toward market allocation in the
guise o-f competition (- and
continue to oppose it - -for one
reason only: it) will hurt the
public.
ELABORATION
136 These and like issues are
at stake in a score or more
regulatory proceedings at the
federal level and in the states.
They are at state in the Justice
Department's antitrust suit
against AT&T. Broadly charac-
terized, those issues turn on
the degree to which competitive
standards should supplant the
public interest standards that
have been the test of the in-
dustry's performance throughout
most of its history.
Figure 1
marketing.
While these and other references indicate an increasingly competitive stand,
the policy statement in 1977 also claims that "competition for competition's
sake is not our aim." This document reiterates the concerns of previous
years that competition has negative consequences for the public interest. In
particular, it is argued that:
To the degree. . .competition forces us to relate our rates
for .. .services more directly to the costs involved, local
exchange rates will rise, thereby jeopardizing the historic trend
that has brought telephone service to 95 per cent of American
households.
AT&T's concern about competition's impact on the rate structure is repeated
over the next several years; but the view of competition itself continues to
evolve in a positive direction, as reflected in the more benign phrases
"regulated competition," "fair competition," "competition in the public
interest," and even "the benefits of competition." While casting itself more
and more as a competitor, the company also begins to complain, however, that
their ability to compete is hampered by their regulated status.
By 1980, a year of major reorganization, the company is certain that "this
industry.
. .will be widely competitive," and they also accept the
inevitability of a different rate structure:
The fact of competition imposes some new economic requirements on
the Bell System, and. . .requires repricing of products and
services.
. .according to cost and market conditions rather than on
"value of service" considerations.
The company continues to be concerned that unregulated competitors will gain
a distinct advantage by competing only in high-volume, low-cost long distance
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service routes, thus 'skimming the cream' and leaving the higher cost,
low-volume service routes to AT&T. Complaints about these "significant
competitive handicaps that apply only to AT&T" are reiterated in 1981 and
1982. Alternatively, AT&T also seeks to assure competitors that the company
will not take unfair advantage of their unique attributes.
With regard to competition, we have said that we seek no
advantage in the marketplace except through performance, and that
we shall be fair competitors. Not even by inadvertence do we
want to provide our competitors a basis for questioning the
integrity with which this business is conducted.
The next year the many concerns and uncertainties about the nature of
competition have been largely put to rest by the Consent Decree. AT&T
accepts that "what once was a regulated monopoly is becoming one of the most
competitive of businesses," and reiterates the hope that regulators will
"remove those aspects of regulation that apply to AT&T but not to its
competitors."
By 1983 the company's description of "strong competition" and a "fully
competitive" situation contrast sharply to its 1975 references to selective
and contrived competition. They speak of being able to test their
"managerial, technological and marketing resources in new and challenging
ways... after so many years of being severely restricted in the business
opportunities" they could pursue. They also suggest that after being
"limited in what we could earn in every part of the business" they "can now
vigorously endeavor to maximize the long term value of our shareowner's
investment."
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A Changing View of Restructuring
During the period that AT&T was changing its view of competition, a closely
linked transformation was taking place in its view of its own structure, and,
concommitantly, the appropriate structure of the industry. Since for many
years AT&T virtually was the telephone industry, it is difficult, and perhaps
inappropriate, to draw a clear line between their discussion of industry
restructuring and internal restructuring. In retrospect, the company's (and
the nation's) task was in fact to disentangle the two.
In 1975, as we have noted, AT&T was primarily concerned about service
"fragmentation" caused by competitors coming into areas they traditionally
served as a monopoly. Their external focus is evident in the claim, from
Figure 1, above, that "market allocation in the guise of competition will
hurt the public." Their breadth of view is also evident in the warrant used
to support this claim: that "the experience of telecommunications authorities
around the world confirms that fragmenting service responsibility impairs
service quality."
By 1977 proposed legislation, not just the government's antitrust suit, was
calling for some degree of divestment. In this year's Report, the company
admits that "restructuring of the supply of telecommunications services" is a
possibility. Their attitude toward the internal effect of such a
restructuring is clearly expressed in the dramatic term "dismemberment,"
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which appears in the required note on pending litigation in the back of the
1977 report:
The company believes that the relief sought [in the Department of
Justice's antitrust suit], which includes dismemberment of the
Bell System, is adverse to the public interest and is confident
that it has not been in violation of the antitrust laws and that
the structure of the Bell System will remain basically
unchanged. In the opinion of the company, dimemberment of the
Bell System would have adverse effects on its business, could
affect its ability to raise capital, its credit standing and the
market value of its securities...
The same statement appears, in almost identical form, for the next four
years. During this time, however, AT&T's attitude towards internal
restructuring is undergoing major changes, and, in fact, AT&T carries out two
significant reorganizations within a three-year span. The aim of the first
of these internal reorganizations, in 1978, is identified as "permit [ting] us
more readily to perceive - and more alertly to respond to - the diverse needs
of our customers."
The next year the company also reports a positive attitude toward further
reorganization:
For our part, we have worked hard to find ways to make
competition work where it makes sense. To this end we have
indicated a readiness to undertake a further restructuring of our
business that would separate our regulated services from
unregulated services, thereby removing the occasion for
competitor's concerns about cross subsidy between them.
By 1980, partly in anticipation of the impact of the FCC's Computer Inquiry
II Decision, and partly, one might surmise, in an effort to ward off, or at
to shape the direction of, externally imposed restructuring, AT&T undertook a
second reorganization of even greater proportions than their 1978 effort.
The redesign involved separating "...those departments whose responsibilities
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relate mainly to regulated activities from those dealing with prospectively
deregulated markets." It is interesting to note, in view of the divestment
provisions accepted by AT&T barely a year later, that what the company saw in
early 1981 as the most probable division between regulated (basic network
services and Long Lines) and "prospectively" deregulated operations
(residence and business products and services, directory and public telephone
services) was very different from the terms ultimately accepted under the
Consent Decree.
The bulk of the arguments identified in our data from the 1980 report relate
to AT&T's effort to establish the validity of the second reorganization. A
number of supporting arguments lay out in detail AT&T's assessment of the
most probable future of the industry and its own place and mode of operating
therein. A major qualifier states, however, that "this realignment. . .does
not in itself represent the radical restructuring that is in prospect for
our business." However, the company does not interpret their reorganization
simply as a preparation for further restructuring likely to be required by
the government. It also claims that reorganization is a means of
"equip [ping] the Bell System to operate in competitive markets."
While the word "dismemberment" is still, for the last time, used in the back
of the 1980 Annual Report in discussing pending government suits, , and
"radical restructuring" has something of the same flavor, this discussion
also uses the word "realignment , " which again puts reorganization in the
context of an external environment.
In 1982, after accepting the terms of the Consent Decree - which included
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divestment of the operating companies - AT&T again uses the term
"realignment." They now speak of the Consent Decree as "disaggregating"
,
and "restructuring" the Bell System. The closest they come to the strength
of sentiment reflected in the earlier use of "dismemberment" is a description
of the Bell System being "broken up" as part of the "unprecedented changes"
occuring in the telecommunications industry.
They acknowledge, in 1983, that their new organization, now structured by
lines of business, "is more than a modification of structure. It represents,
for us, a major change in organizational philosophy." But they speak
positively of the "new, more compact AT&T' now able to "test its managerial,
technological and marketing resources in new and challenging ways."
Contributions to a Changed View of Competition and Restructuring
The data summarized above shows AT&T moving from a negative and defensive
view of competition to a positive description of AT&T as a willing and able
competitor. Initially competition is seen as a unwelcome intrusion, a
"contradiction of the traditional aims of the telephone industry." As they
increasingly accept the inevitability of competition, they begin to see
themselves more and more as competitors and start to fill in the details:
changes in rate making practices, and their own behavior as a competitor.
AT&T's view of restructuring undergoes a similarly remarkable change. From a
strong defense of the traditional structure of the telephone industry, which
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is to say the Bell System's monopoly and its integrated structure, AT&T moves
to internal efforts to anticipate the requirements of its most likely future,
from there to acceptance of the Consent Decree and the complete restructuring
of AT&T. The restructuring proposals by the Justice Department and others
are intially seen as attempted "dismemberment"; later, the divestment of
two-thirds of its corporate mass under the Consent Decree is presented as
"realignment," "disaggregation," and "reorganization."
One might say that AT&T's transition merely reflects genuine changes in the
telecommunications environment noted by many observers. And it is certainly
true that AT&T has had to accommodate itself to being competitive in an
altered form, and in a vastly changed industry setting, in order to survive.
We are interested, however, in how AT&T was able to make these very necessary
transitions. Not all companies do recognize "obvious" changes in the
environment: Ford Motor Company, and many others, have not dropped their
Model Ts soon enough. While it is not yet clear whether AT&T has correctly
diagnosed the changing nature of the telecommunications industry or found a
strategy that will allow them to be successful in this new setting, they have
made major changes in their strategic posture over the last decade.
Questions about how these changes came about form the basis for one of many
detailed studies which need to be made in order to understand more about the
process of strategy reformulation.
Our coding method allows us an interesting way of studying how changes in
attitudes toward competition and organizational structure took place. By
looking at the argument context in which these words, and their synonyms, are
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used, we are able to identify other concepts that accompany each idea through
time, and look at how these concepts also change. Two additional concepts
which often appear in the same arguments as competition and structure seem
especially important.
First, AT&T changed its concept of technology. In arguments about what
provides the impetus for and what justifies its changes in strategy, the
factor of technological change began to take precedence over other influences
such as actual or potential government intervention or competitive
pressures.
Second, the company finds ways of maintaining a concept which had been
central to its strategy for over a hundred years - the concept that its
activites serve the public interest. The next two sections of the paper
follow these two ideas in more detail.
A Changed View of Technology
Although not as frequently mentioned as competition, technology is referred
to 68 times in the Annual Reports. In the early years these occurrences
refer to AT&T's own technological competence. In 1975, for example, chairman
deButts wrote:
Generations of telephone people have addressed themselves
continuously not only to the advancement of co—mi cations
technology - the means by which one man may reach another in a
distant place - but to the development of the operating standards
and the shaping of organizational resources that would make that
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faculty available to as many people as possible at as low a cost
as possible.
This claim echos many others made in 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1978 which refer to
AT&T's technology as a way of "improving efficiency," providing "revenue
opportunities," and "contributing to our ability to accomplish more with
less." Such claims are interesting because they so closely link technology
with ideas that are central to AT&T's strategy and self concept at the
beginning of the time period we studied - the strategy which leds them to
vigorously resist competition and reorganization. Technology is seen as a
means for offering efficient and economical service to "as many people as
possible," and it depends upon a "unified" structure.
Very gradually, however, the company begins to refer not just to their own
technology, but to technology in a more general sense. In 1976 they support
the FCC's Second Computer Inquiry because it is to investigate the linking of
data processing and communications technology. In 1978 they speak, for the
first time, of the "Information Age" as something distinct from themselves,
even though they quickly add that "for its coming, no business is more
responsible than ours." The real changes, however, occur in the last three
years of the period studied.
Whereas previously the company was concerned that "regulated competition"
might limit their ability to use their technological expertise, in 1980 the
company links competition and technology in a new way by arguing that
competition can make a contribution to technological development.
Traditionally the Bell System has addressed its research and
development activities to system optimization, the balanced
improvement of our service capabilities in the context of our
obligations to the entire public we serve.
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Competition by contrast spurs innovation at competitive pressure
points.
One is strategic, the other tactical. Our aim is to combine the
best of both.
This new view foreshadows the prominent role played by technology in AT&T's
explanation of its signing the Consent Decree, as evidenced in this portion
of the 1981 Annual Report subtitled "A New Era."
For most of the Bell System's history, our business was easily
defined. It was, simply, the telephone business.
Then in recent decades, as telephone lines began carrying
television, data and other forms of communications as well as
telelphone calls, it was evident that the business was changing.
It had become telecommunications.
Now our business is changing once again. It is communications
enhanced by information technologies. It is the business of
transporting and managing information.
In short, it is a new era.
Three influences have quickened the pace of change in the
industry: the development of new, Information Age markets for
communciations and information-related services; advances in
technology that helped create these new markets and which will
foster their growth; and the unfolding of governmental policies
endorsing increased competition and reduced regulation.
Responding effectively to the changes taking place in the
industry requires changes on our part, too: changes in the way we
provide and price our services, in the financial management of
the business and, most of all, in the way we are structured.
The consent Decree agreed to by AT&T early in 1982, the basis for
the government's action in agreeing to drop its antitrust suit,
is a clear demonstration of our readiness to adapt to the changed
environment we confront in the 1980' s.
This quote summarizes a transition that can, in fact, be traced through the
company's choice of words over the time period we studied. From 1975 to 1976
the term "telephone industry" is used an average of 4 times each year;
"telecommunications industry" is used once in each report. After one last
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reference in 1979, "telephone industry" does not appear again, and
"telecommunications industry" appears 6 times in 1979 and 1980. But this
transition is itself quickly broadened. In 1983 the company defines
themselves as "meeting customer needs, worldwide, for the electronic movement
and management of information," they speak of their "telecommunications and
information network," and "telecommunications industry" as a term does not
appear at all.
In summary, AT&T developed an expanded view of technological development:
technology is something the company has a privileged position in
understanding and using; but it is now also seen as something occurring
outside the company's control. This new view became critical to the way in
which AT&T defined itself and its acceptance of the Consent Decree.
Essentially, the company cited technological change as the major motivator
for government intervention in its affairs, cited technological change, not
reorganization or competition, as the major influence on the industry, and
gave its ability to compete technologically as the major rationale for its
acceptance of the Consent Decree.
The point is made more succinctly in a later quote from the 1981 Report, a
quote which puts competition in third place as an influence on the industry:
New technologies. Information Age markets. Increasing
competition.
These are the major elements of change in our business, and it is
to take them into account that in recent years a new national
telecommunications policy has been evolving.
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A Changed View of Service in the Public Interest
Another theme that is frequently found in discussions of competition and
restructuring is the theme of the public interest. As Figure 1 (above)
shows, in 1975 AT&T characterized federal actions as testing "the degree to
which competitive standards should supplant the public interest standards
that have been the test of the industry's performance throughout its
history." And they opposed regulatory decisions they saw as "market
allocation in the guise of competition" on the grounds that "it will hurt the
public."
Arguments made over the next several years continue to show a tight link
between the company's negative stand on increasing competition and their
concept of service in the public interest. In 1976, for example, they argue
against the trend of FCC decision making by linking competition with
increasing rates, which in turn will jeopardize the availability of "widely
affordable" service. Speaking to Congress that same year, deButts suggested
that the FCC had "exceeded its assigned function" and begun to "legislate"
national policy in favor of specialized rather than general public
interests.
...the issue confronting us is not simply a question of monopoly
versus competition but the rather more fundamental question: What
is the basic aim of this country's telecommunications policy? Is
it, as we in the industry had conceived it to be and the
Communications Act appears to confirm, to promote the widest
availability of high quality communications service at the lowest
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cost to
x
all the people of the United States?' Or does that aim
now yield to the particularized interests of special classes of
users? If the latter be the case, let it be candidly recognized
that for what only some people want everybody sooner or later
pays.
As various federal activities continued, however, the company came to see
that their former conception of the public interest as "high quality
communications service at the lowest cost to all the people of the United
States" was indeed too narrow. In 1977 they begin to talk of "conflicting
public interest objectives." Although they still maintain that the public
interest demands a unified network capable of promoting economical, widely
available service, they also begin to recognize "market" demands as another
form of public interest.
On the one hand, the public interest will be served by providing
more customer options and more diversified services in the
specialized sectors of telecomunications and, on the other, [the
public interest will be served] by maintaining the technical and
operation integrity of the public switched network and a rate
structure that promotes the widest availability of its services.
In 1978 the company acts on this expanded awareness by restructuring itself
along market lines. Their explanation of this action as responding to "the
increasing diversification of customer's needs" marks the increasing
attention given to customers, and stockholders, versus an almost exclusive
emphasis on the public in earlier years. "Customer service," for example,
begins to appear in 1978 where previously service appeared alone or in
arguments involving the public as a whole. This development is paralleled by
an appearance of "customer interest" and "stockholder interest" along with
the familiar "public interest."
Meanwhile, development of AT&T's changed understanding of the public interest
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is evidenced by their 1979 statement "at year's end, there appeared to be a
growing consensus that legislation can be developed which can yield the
public the benefits of competition." Their continuing concern about rates
and the integrity of their own structure, however, is apparent in their
addition that these benefits appear "not [to] compromise the management of
the basic telecommunications network or result in such dramatic increases in
the price of rural and home service as to impair the wide availability and
affordability of basic telephone service."
In 1980, however, what the company described as "a gathering consensus on
national telecommunications policy" leads them to reverse the above view.
Here they describe the impetus for their second major restructuring:
We shall be transforming a business that for more than 60 years
has been structured to meet the requirements of a highly
regulated environment to one that matches the dictates of a day
and age that looks mainly to the marketplace to decide what
products and services the public will be supplied, who will
supply them and at what price.
This represents a major change in the company's view of the public and their
own relationship to that public. A later quote from the same report
indicates that the company has also relinquished their longstanding concerns
about the impact of competition on the rates which the public must bear:
The fact of competition imposes some new economic requirements on
the Bell System, and, in some cases, the general public as well.
It requires repricing of products and service - pricing them
according to cost and market conditions rather than on "value of
service" considerations.
Once this essential transition is made, the company becomes increasingly
positive about the public interest aspects of changes in the
telecommunications industry. In 1981 they offer a very interesting argument
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(outlined in Figure 2) about the benefits of the Consent Decree.
Figure 2 about here
This argument shows the increasing importance of share owners and customers,
in GROUNDS # 1, and the broad reach of the company's understanding of
changing technology, which in GROUNDS # 2 is used to justify the decree as a
way of bringing technological benefits to the American public.
The concept of the public interest was thus not dropped over the time period
we studied. Instead, the company modified their understanding of the nature
of the public interest and how it might be served. Far from relinquishing
their past emphasis on public interest, they use this modified concept as a
bridge to the future. In 1982, for example, they note:
There is much from our past that we consider important to our
future: for example, the sense that ours is a business motivated
by public interest concerns as well as prof it ... .Simply put, we
intend to honor our past and [emphasis in the report] fulfill the
promise of our future.
But, it is also interesting to note that this report mentions the public
interest only this once, and goes on to discuss their customers in ten other
places. (In 1983 the ratio is 2 to 15.) In essence, AT&T moved from
concentration on their own technology to an expanded view of "Information
Age" technology creating an industry, while contracting their view of
themselves as serving the public to a view of the public well served by a
group of competing service providers.
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GROUNDS # 1
070 We believe we were
successful in achieving a
reasonable balance in all
respects.
ELABORATION
066 The Consent Decree is an
attempt to balance, in
addition to the interests of
our three million share
owners, the interests o-f tens
of millions of people who use
our services, of more than a
million Bell System employees
and of the nation as a whole.
GROUNDS ft 2
072 A major consideration on
our part and the government'!
was to assure to the extent we
can that this country's
telecommunications industry
will retain its leadership
position in world markets.
GROUNDS # 3
075 Another was to arrive at
an operating framework that
will help to promote the full
development of Information Age
technologies and bring their
benefits to the American
publ ic.
KEY CLAIM
079 In short, we believe the
Consent Decree meets every
relevant test of the public
interest.
SUBCLAIM ft 1
080 We look forward to its
acceptance by the court.
Figure 2
Strategy as Pattern
Mintzberg et al. (1976) have suggested that strategy can usefully be seen as
a pattern of activities which may or may not be fully intended. Their
schematic, in Figure 3, shows that pattern is created as certain strategies
in a core set of intended strategies are abandoned while other strategies
emerge as experience shows they have made a positive contribution to the
organization.
t> >
Intended Strategy /\ Deliberate Strategy /\ Realized Strategy
?
Unrealized Strategy Emergent Strategy
Mintzberg's (1978) view of strategic pattern is generated
Figure 3
This schematic can be extended, as in Figure 4, to show an ongoing stream of
strategic concepts to which major modifications are made in irregular periods
of strategy reformulation (Huff, 1982).
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Deliberate Strategy
\1/
deletion addition
/K/K /ts /N
\i/ Nl/
time
->
An alternative view of strategic pattern generation
Figure 4
This way of thinking about strategy is important because it emphasizes the
essential link between the process of strategy formulation and its content -
a union that too much research artifically severs.
The analysis presented in this paper illustrates a method for explaining the
process shown in Figure 4 in terras of changing content. Strategy is
identified as a set of concepts about the company and its situation. The use
of computer text files makes it practical to follow a rather large set of key
words representing these concepts and count their use over time in documents
created by the company. The word count provides, at the least, a rough
estimate of the use of specific concepts and points to portions of the data
base that can be examined for a more complex understanding of the concepts
dropped or added to the organization's strategy.
This paper also suggests, however, that the view of strategy reformulation
represented in Figures 3 and 4 is inadequate in an important way. One of the
things that makes reformulating strategy so difficult is that each concept of
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importance in an organization's strategy is linked to other important
concepts. The nature of the linkage is made apparent when statements of
strategy are broken down into "arguments" - claims about what is true,
evidence presented in support of those claims, and qualifiers to their
applicability.
Our analysis of AT&T suggests that as a company's understanding of an
important strategic concept (like "competition") changes, the arguments in
which it appears are likely to change as well. But arguments are themselves
nested and interlinked. A given argument, once accepted, becomes the grounds
upon which subsequent arguments are built. Thus change in some arguments
bring about changes in other arguments, and the "summary claims," such as
those we try to capture in our year by year overview, are themelves changed.
There is a story about the newcomer to China who is told that the world is
carried on the back of a giant turtle. "What does the turtle stand on?" the
skeptical newcomer asks. "On the back of another turtle," he is told. "But
what does that turtle stand on?" he persists. "Oh," he is told, without
concern, "it's turtles all the way down."
The problem with strategy reformulation is that it is "turtles all the way
down." Most discussions of good strategy emphasize fit and synergy. But
when strategy must be changed, fit and synergy can become liabilities. The
closer the fit and the higher the degree of synergy, the less likely it is
that the effects of change in one area of the strategy can be x sealed off;
and the more likely it is that such a change will cause a chain reaction,
possibly unintended, of changes throughout the whole of the strategy.
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Our analysis suggests, however, the way in which the chain reaction is
arrested. Old concepts and arguments are not all abandoned. Some are
refurbished so that they can continue to bear the burdens they have in the
past. Thus technology and public service, two concepts that were central to
AT&T's strategy from its inception, are reworked to fit into a radically
altered strategy. Far from seeing this salvage effort as an unfortunate
inability to develop new strategy unfettered by the past, we would argue that
such links are a necessary ingredient in strategy reformulation, and,
therefore, that understanding the links between old strategy and new is a
critical task in the ongoing investigation of reformulation.
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Appendix A
Sample Coded Text - 1975 Annual Report
KEY CLAIM LINE NO: 118 TYPE:
118 (We have opposed) this trend toward market allocation in the
119 guise of competition (- and continue to oppose it - for one
120 reason only: it) will hurt the public.
GROUNDS # 1 -for line: 118 LINE NO: 123 if CLAIM, TYPE:
123 [Fragmented service], we believe, will be the consequence, for
124 example, of the Federal Communications Commission's proposal
125 that telephone companies be required to permit direct
126 connection to their lines of terminal equipment ovBr which
127 they have no control.
WARRANT links claim line: 113 with grounds line: 123
LINE NO: 120 if CLAIM, TYPE:
120 The experience of
121 telecommunications authorities around the world confirms
122 that fragmenting service responsibility impairs service
123 qual i ty
.
GROUNDS # 2 for line: 118 LINE NO: 128 if CLAIM, TYPE:
12S This same trend C toward market allocation in the guise
of competition!! compromises - indeed it contradicts - the
129 principle of universality.
GROUNDS # 1 for line: 128 LINE NO: 129
129 To compensate for the loss to
130 competitors of revenues that help to pay the common costs of
131 all their services, telephone companies will have no
132 alternative except to raise their rates for basic exchange
133 service, thereby reversing their historic aim of bringing
134 telephone service within the economic reach of more and more
135 people.
Appendix A - continued
Sample Coded Text - 1975 Annual Report
ELABORATION o-f line: 118 LINE NO: 136 : trend
136 These and like issues e.re at stake in a score or more
137 regulatory proceedings at the -federal level and in the
13S states. They a.re at state in the Justice Department's
139 antitrust suit against AT&T. Broadly characterized, those
140 issues turn on the degree to which competitive standards
141 should supplant the public interest standards that have been
142 the test o-f the industry's performance throughout most of
143 its history.
Appendix B
Sample Output o-f Word Search Routines
Search: compet-
1975
-competi tors-
107 Over recent years, this concept
108 has been breached by a series ot regulatory decisions that
109 have opened more and more of the field o-f telecommunications
110 to entry by "competitors" who are free to serve selected
111 segments of the market but who do not at the same time share
112 the regulated common carriers' obligation to serve the
113 entire public.
-competi tion-
113 We have opposed this trend toward market allocation in the
119 guise of competi ton - and continue to oppose it - for one
120 reason only: it will hurt the public.
-competi tors-
129 To compensate for the loss to
130 competitors of revenues that help to pay the common costs of
131 all their services, telephone companies will have no
132 alternative except to raise their rates for basic exchange
133 service, thereby reversing their historic aim of bringing
134 telephone service within the economic reach of more and more
135 people.
-competi ti ve-
140 Broadly characterized, those
140 issues turn on the degree to which competitive standards
141 should supplant the public interest standards that have been
142 the test of the industry's performance throughout most of
143 its history.
-competi tion-
•CD
:9
Stressing, as we have previously, that competition will
result in higher overall costs and in increased basic
telephone rates for the great majority of residence
'40 customers, we stated at the start of the inquiry that there
>41 ar<= no substantial economic facts to support changing the
'42 regulated natural monopoly structure of telecommunications.



